

All-Volunteer Force: National Population, Distributional (Un)Willingness and Martial Tendency

*Murtala, Wazeer*¹

Abstract

National population has always been traditionally seen as one of the elements of a state's power, especially as it relates to military recruitment. This traditional understanding is largely true under the instrument of conscription through the draft procedure. However, the transition to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has brought new questions to the fore, regarding the population-military-recruitment or enlistment dynamics. By using a qualitative research methodology, this study finds that the traditional view of national population as suggestive of a country's military recruitment or enlistment potential may not be compatible with the reality of AVF today. It introduces Distributional Un/Willingness which aims to describe the dispersion of the population to understand the connection between the state and its population in terms of recruitment under AVF. It concludes by suggesting transnational recruitment with an emphasis on martial tendency as one of the solutions to the problem of recruitment and retention for countries that have the political will and financial wherewithal.

Keywords: recruitment, population, distributional (un)willingness, martial tendency, and military

Introduction

The centrality of military security to states in the international system is a well-established discourse among experts in the field of international relations. Theorists from different schools, such as classical realism

¹ Wazeer Murtala, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2440-2373>. Katholieke Universiteit Oude Markt 13, 3000 Leuven, Belgium

and neo-realism, have particularly created a link between sovereignty and the power dynamics within a state (hierarchical sovereignty), and among states (horizontal sovereignty) (Clempton, 2011; Tapia, 2020; Walt, 1991, 2010). The proliferation of security challenges within a state as exemplified by the existence of different state-threatening groups, such as Boko Haram (Nigeria), Al-Shabaab (Somalia), Atomwaffen (USA), that are located within the state, and other threats that emanate from outside, such as piracy, transnational terrorism and in some cases, inter-state wars that have led to the deployment of troops, reinforce the need to maintain responsive military capabilities. The seemingly less power-centric theories, such as idealism and institutionalism, discourses like collective security, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) or similar interstate setups, also suggest that security through a credible military force is important to states. As such, in an otherwise 'less predictable' international community, despite the existence of multilateralism and institutions, states must still be ready to confront international crimes and various security challenges from different actors.

Accordingly, the significance of military power is well established because it gives states the ability to enforce what goes on within their borders and, to some extent, what comes from outside the borders as well as respond to other geopolitical scenarios where national interests are threatened (Scheer, 2012). In this regard, all elements of power can be deemed as instrumental to a state's security. According to Jablonsky, the elements of power can be classified into natural determinants, such as geography and population; and, social determinants, such as economic, political, and military. However, "national power is linked historically with military capacity" (Jablonsky, 2006, p. 127). Elsewhere, military capacity has also been seen as one of the major characteristics of a sovereign state whose function is to provide security and to compete geopolitically (Scheer, 2012). By extension, military capacity rests largely on other factors, such as a robust economy, technological innovation as evident in the industrial capacity to produce state-of-the-arts weapons as well as the capability of a state to amass a relatively high number of troops to fulfil its recruitment

needs. The possibility of recruiting for the military is invariably linked to the existence of an efficient population and a sizable pool of citizens that have reached the military service age. Of all the elements of power, an efficient population has been described as very important and difficult to substitute because “weapons and materials are worthless without men to wield them” (Kingsley, 1954, p. 210).

As a contemporary illustration, the significance of manpower to military capability, despite access to good technology and weapons, can be seen in the toil of some industrially well-established countries like Belgium, Germany and even the United States of America to consistently push to maintain a robust manpower for their militaries in the long aftermath of their transitions to an all-volunteer force (Galindo, 2019; NATO, 2007; Perraudin, 2019; Tobias, 2019). In terms of military recruitment, which is considered an important factor for security, it has also been suggested that “human resource is a major perpetual requirement for national security, especially in the armed forces” (Murtala, 2020, p. 9). As a result, this present paper aims to shed new lights on the relationship between national population and military recruitment or enlistment under AVF.

The aim of this research is twofold. First, it seeks to understand how the population (as an element of power) for a state that uses AVF can be understood in terms of possible enlistment for military service. Secondly, it aims to proffer a solution to this problem by suggesting alternative areas of recruitment where efficiency can be procured based on the understanding that a return to conscription may be difficult. Previous works such as Moskos have underlined how reverting to conscription after it has been abandoned in the United States of America for example could lead to complications, such as the need for a national consensus (and possible protests among college students) and the dilemma of whom to choose due to new demographic situations (Moskos, 1981). In this regard, it is important, not only to understand the population of a state as a significant element of national power, but to also understand the distribution of a population in terms of their (un)willingness to

voluntarily enlist in the military and how this may affect the drive towards recruitment into the armed forces by the state.

Research Methodology

This research involved a series of interviews conducted among individuals from different nationalities over more than 2 years, beginning from the later part of 2019 to the year 2022. The first part was conducted among residents of Belgium. It was then followed up by another work with a more international focus where I tried to understand the generic factors that serve as hurdles towards willingness to enlist in the military. In the first part, 14 individuals were interviewed through a purposefully selected sample to understand their willingness or lack of willingness to enlist in the military. Their responses were then coded using Quirkos qualitative software where I adopted framework analysis and grounded theory. In the second part, a Google form was created with selected questions where I generated responses from participants with a focus to understand factors that discourage individuals from enlisting in the military from a generic perspective. The Google form was then followed up by further interviews based on the responses from the questionnaire. In total, 40 participants were interviewed from Belgium, Nigeria, Congo, Ghana, the United Kingdom, Oman, and India. Seven Google respondents did not fill in details about their nationalities.

Table 1: Distribution of participants

Gender		Nationalities							
Males	Females	Nigeria, Egypt, Ghana	Congo, Belgium	UK	Oman	Romania	Indonesia	Dutch	Unknown
		24	11	1	1	1	1	1	7
37	10								
Total: 47		Total: 47							

Military Recruitment: Conscription versus Voluntary Enlistment

The demand for supply of workforce for military recruitment has been managed by different states by using, at least, two basic methods which are conscription into the military through draft and the establishment of voluntary enlistment. The consideration of a huge population as an advantage in terms of military recruitment also requires a distinction between the type of state (e.g., totalitarian state versus non-totalitarian) and the instruments they use for recruitment (e.g., draft versus voluntary enlistment). From the military perspective as it relates to recruitment for combat-related tasks, a population can only be considered as an element of state power for the military if the regime has a degree of control over the population in terms of “deployability” to theatres of operation. A dissenting or unwilling population cannot be an element of power in terms of military recruitment under a regime. As a result, the norms that exist in a state at the level of doctrine (e.g., totalitarianism) and instruments of recruitment (conscription or voluntary service) are pivotal in trying to understand the degree of control that a state has over the population and its deployment for national military interest.

Military Recruitment under the Draft Instrument (Conscription)

Conscription has been defined as “any policy which relies on the threat or use of force to recruit members into the military” (Asal et al., 2017, p. 3). It involves the use of law, threat of punishment and other tools of compliance to compel a section of the citizenry (either by gender or age) to join the national military. In a state that enforces conscription, the degree of control that the state has over the population by the draft instrument (conscription) would imply that all available members of the population are potential recruits into the military and are by default available to be used in military service. Thus, it has been claimed that conscription allows a larger part of the population to partake in the military at different levels (Choulis et al., 2021). In principle, conscription offers a relatively expanded supply of labour for the armed forces; however, the efficiency of such supply has been questioned (Poutvaara & Wagener, 2007).

Although, conscription appears to offer a higher recruitment turnout for the military, however, due to several factors, such as the change in the perception of threats, economic development, general demilitarization, regional integration and other factors, the instrument of conscription was abandoned in favor of an AVF in most countries (Asal et al., 2017; Leander, 2004; Levi, 1996; Poutvaara & Wagener, 2007). One more important factor in the transition from conscription to AVF appears to be the consideration for the rights of individuals in most liberal democracies due to the post-modernist approach which focuses on welfare. The norm shifted from the one that

saw citizens . . . as instruments for the protection of national interests [where] every resource (human and material) that could be mobilised to defend the state must be deployed in the pursuit of state objectives

to the one that emphasizes freedom and putting the rights of the citizens at par (Murtala, 2020, p. 15).

Military Recruitment: All-Volunteer Force

An AVF can be described as an enlistment process that allows individuals to willingly enlist in the military without being forced to do so. In the aftermath of the abolition of conscription in some states, countries that transitioned into an all-volunteer force require new incentives to attract citizens into the military since the use of threat and compelling (that applied under the draft instrument) are increasingly seen as obsolete and less applicable under the voluntary enlistment system. However, AVF has not come without its peculiar challenges. One of the major drawbacks with AVF is the reduced propensity among individuals to willingly enlist in the military, partly leading to the inability of some states to fulfil their national recruitment needs (Rostker, 2006). Although, the drawback had been anticipated in the past, the reality of unwillingness to enlist among the population has recently come to the fore. In the light of persistent international threats and new challenges, the problem with AVF has

become evidenced today. At a period of renewed international struggle in Europe and elsewhere, characterised by what Joseph Borell described as “power politics” and the return of “war between states...like in the Second World War...” (Josep, 2022), the need to recruit more soldiers can never be overestimated, especially at a time when some states that rely on voluntary enlistment are struggling to bolster their ranks with the much needed manpower (Galindo, 2019; NATO, 2007; Perraudin, 2019; Philipps, 2022; Tobias, 2019; Winkie, 2022). As a result of this recruitment problem, it has become expedient to understand the distribution of the population vis-a-vis the potential for military recruitment through what I have termed *distributional (un)willingness*. However, before I proceed, it is important to explain some of the existing theoretical and conceptual understanding for enlistment and recruitment into the military and, then, the key terms that relate to willingness in this regard.

Existing Theories on Voluntary Enlistment and the Understanding of Recruitment

The extant theoretical understanding of military recruitment can be approached from two sides which represent the supply and demand perspectives respectively. The supply perspective underlines the motivation for voluntary enlistment by individuals. The latter which deals with the demand side is aimed at understanding why states recruit individuals into the armed forces.

Enlistment intentions: Institutional and occupational motivations: The theoretical frames for explaining the willingness or propensity to enlist voluntarily in the military has gained popularity after the abolition of conscription especially in the United States. One of the leading works in this area is the contribution by Moskos who introduced *institutional* motivation and *occupational* motivation as models to understand why individuals enlist in the military (from the supply perspective). Institutional motivation is explained as the motivation to join the military that is guided by a “purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good” (Moskos, 1977, p. 2). Institutional

considerations for enlistment are largely guided by values such as honour, duty to the motherland and the prestige that are socially associated with military service. In contrast, occupational motivation for military enlistment is propelled by tangible “self-interest” (Moskos, 1977, p. 3) such as the desire for a job and good salaries that may come with it. Following Mosko, Griffith has opined that institutional motivation is tailored towards intrinsic motivations to serve which is similar to what Eighmey describes as including fidelity. (Eighmey, 2006; Griffith, 2008). Accordingly, extrinsic motivations can be considered as synonymous to occupational motivation for enlistment. Although these frameworks are useful to explain why individuals enlist in the military from the supply side of the curve, they fall short in trying to understand why states recruit individuals into the armed forces from the demand side of the curve. To understand why states recruit, I turn to some existing concepts from the field of strategic studies below.

Recruitment Motivation (Why States Recruit):

Albeit enlistment into the military has been largely treated from the perspective of human resource and management, this present paper seeks to explain recruitment into the military within the realm of strategic studies by adapting the concepts of *military-force-centred approach* and *structural realism* to the phenomenon of military recruitment.

Military force centred-approach: This approach sees “military force as a permanent state institution, engaged in a whole spectrum of activities, not confined to war” (Lider, 1980, p. 8). The desire to build military forces is part of the overall drive toward the survival of a state’s apparatus including the regime. Under this approach, national security is paramount and military recruitment is driven by the need to defend a nation’s values. This includes the capability of a state to survive as a political unit and to enjoy freedom from all physical threats whether external or internal including responding to natural disasters (Lider, 1980).

Structural Realism: This suggests that the behaviour of states in the international system is influenced by the anarchic nature of the

international environment in which they operate (Lobell, 2017). It delineates between offensive and defensive capabilities that states build. From the offensive realist perspective, states strive to maximise their power to ensure their safety relative to the potential threats they face or the objective they intend to achieve. As a result, states resort to self-help to ensure their own security and safety. Deriving from this, recruitment into the military is built on the understanding that states try to maximise their resources and, by extension, power due to the nature of the international system. Thus, this present paper holds that one of the ways of maximising their power relative to other actors is by building a considerably large military in response to their perception of threat in the system, and in consideration of their capacity to sustain a military force. Consequently, the choice of recruitment is not made in a vacuum, but as a response to the level of international threat that the state perceives.

Although these theories and concepts as explained above have been useful in trying to explain willingness in an AVF recruitment system and why states recruit into the military generally, they are not explicit at understanding the configuration of a population for active military service. To understand the general population, I introduce *distributional (un)willingness* under the section of conceptual clarifications below. To do this, I first explain what is intended by *willingness* and *unwillingness*.

Conceptual Clarifications

Willingness: 'Willingness' is conceptualized here as the propensity to enlist in the military without coercion by the state.

Unwillingness: This implies the lack of interest in voluntary enlistment in the military by an individual or a group of individuals.

Distributional (un)Willingness: Distributional (un)willingness aims to systematically describe the assortment of an entire population and its dispersal regarding their possible willingness or unwillingness towards voluntary enlistment in the military. It classifies the citizens into three groups under the instrument of AVF via *extreme unwillingness*, *conditional willingness or unwillingness*, and *extreme willingness* to enlist

in the military. It accepts that the population of a given state is an element of national power for potential military use; however, it underlines that having a large population does not automatically imply enlistment for the military and that to understand military suitability regardless of the size of a population in an AVF, it is important to understand the categorisation of the population.

Analysis: Results and Discussion

i. Distribution of the population

The finding from my interview suggests that the un/willingness to voluntarily enlist in the military of a state can be distributed across three groups in a population. These are:

- a. Extreme unwillingness in voluntary military service
- b. Conditional willingness (and unwillingness) in voluntary military service
- c. Extreme willingness in military enlistment

Table 2: Distributional (un)willingness

Extreme unwillingness
Conditional willingness (or unwillingness) towards voluntary service
Extreme willingness in voluntary military service

ii. Extreme unwillingness towards voluntary military enlistment

Extreme unwillingness can be described as the revolting feeling that is displayed by an individual or a group of people towards military service. This type of reluctance towards enlistment may be informed by innate desire against war, pacifist inclinations due to religious or moral values and similar intrinsic persuasions that are held by an individual (Murtala, 2020).

From the interviews that were conducted, extreme reluctance is expressed by remarks that showcase desire against war or any war-related institution such as the military. Individuals who exhibit extreme unwillingness towards the military are either motivated by religious values or pacifism. Accordingly, participants who fall into this category came up with responses, such as “I hate wars,” “I just don’t wanna die,” or that their religious beliefs forbid them from joining any military by stressing that “no because I am a Christian. Not all Christians think like that, but I believe in peace – non-violence.” Other responses from participants in this regard include “nobody deserves to be killed for any reason,” “I cannot leave my family,” “I believe in non-violence,” “I just don’t want (the military), I don’t need anything (to motivate me),” “I don’t want to do it, it is not something I am passionate about, I am not going to be happy” or the consideration of military life as too “risky.” In terms of the possibility of voluntarily enlisting in the military, the probability of individuals who fall under this category to enlist in the military appears to be significantly low or non-existent. Declining to joining the military under religious influence and objections is a well-established reason for individuals to ignore voluntary enlistment. Under the conscientious objection clause, individuals who have strong moral objections that are explicitly linked to their belief can be exempted from the military (Kemp, 1993).

iii. Conditional (un)willingness towards voluntary service

Conditional (un)willingness can be described as willingness (or the lack of willingness) to voluntarily enlist in the military that is contingent on other factors that are not innate. They are informed by extrinsic factors such as job opportunities elsewhere or not ranking the military as a top professional option, or due to a lack of other attractive extrinsic incentives from the military.

Participants that fall under this category consider the military as a possible career option based on tangible benefits from the military. Those who are conditionally unwilling to voluntarily enlist in the military cite low salary and other extrinsic factors as reasons for lack of willingness in

voluntary enlistment. As evident in their responses, their willingness or lack of willingness rests on the military's ability to fulfil their requirements. According to a participant, when I asked if he would enlist in the military for a high salary that exceeds the minimum income by more than 60%, he responded that "if they should offer me such amount, and meet my requirements also, maybe I can join. They have their own requirements and I have my requirements." His requirements include "everything like social benefits, holiday packages and all that." Others stress that "the things they (the military) require from the people cannot be met." A female participant that does not consider the military as a first option for her career also quipped that "my first choice will be to work as a gynecologist, but if they really need people (in the military), I think that could be a possibility (to voluntarily enlist). If I know I am not going to start a family..." As part of the conditional (un)willingness, others stress that they can only join the military provided they will not be deployed for combat roles. Responses in this regard are "(if I can work as a) computer scientist...I think they have computer scientists in the military because they have to search... information... maybe some data base so I think so (I can enlist)."

Consequently, it could be deduced that those who saw the military as providing better benefits (financially or in other ways such as good insurance, job stability, stable pension, access to education and similar advantages) compared to other sectors of employment may be enthused to enlist voluntarily in the military. This realization is consistent with the occupational motivation model that has been discussed previously (Moskos, 1977). As a result, low salary, high salary and other job-related factors have been cited as affecting the possibility of voluntary enlistment (Asch et al., 1999; Ginexi et al., 1994; Kleykamp, 2006)the report examines trends in college attendance and the economic returns from attending college, describes the options that the military currently offers to combine service and college, and enumerates the types of issues that would need to be considered in developing and expanding recruiting programs that target college-bound youth. The report should be of interest to those concerned

about military recruiting as well as to the larger defense manpower research community. (Contains 33 references.. It is noteworthy to point out that it is believed that the military has often recruited combatants from low-income households or communities in what has been called poverty draft (CRIN, 2019; McGlynn & Lavariega Monforti, 2010). However, as more households produce graduates who have higher chances of getting higher salaries from non-combat and low risk civilian employments, the idea of joining the military as a purely occupational venture appears to be pushed aside despite a series of adverts aimed at recruiting young men and women from poor households in high schools and elsewhere (Ella, 2021; Hagopian & Barker, 2011). Compared to other sectors, especially the IT industry, the military is considered as a less attractive alternative in many countries for new entrants. In Germany, for instance, where ICT specialists and cyber-security experts earned between 4,000 to 6,000 euros in 2018, NCOs in the military reportedly earned significantly less (Schulz, 2019). In Belgium, the pay rise for servicemen came only after 18 years compared to other sectors. With this, the idea of enlisting in the military for occupational reasons when other sectors pay better can be seen as off-putting to potential occupational enlistees. In converse, the military would need to compete with other sectors to attract individuals that fall under this category of conditional (un)willingness.

The decision to choose careers in other sectors also appears to be informed by a general lack of trust in the political authority. Some individuals appear to be willing to fight for a 'just cause' or to defend their local space when there is a perceived threat to their country such as an actual invasion. However, they do not want to be used as 'cannon fodders' abroad especially when they have less trust in the political leadership. This is exemplified by a Belgian participant with Congolese ancestry who stresses that "I will defend Belgium, but I will not go to attack China in China. Imagine like it has happened in the past to attack the Chinese people, I would not do like that." This shows that, although some may dislike the military as an institution and may never be interested to apply to join the military during a period of peace or for missions abroad, they

appear to still be willing to voluntarily enlist if the country is under an invasive attack by an external force that constitutes an imminent danger to their environment.

iv. Extreme willingness in military enlistment

Extreme willingness in voluntary enlistment can be described as the presence of a very strong motivation to enlist in the military in an individual or a group of individuals. The participants that show extreme willingness regard working in the military environment in any capacity, especially as combatants as a lifetime opportunity. Their responses in this regard show a high level of intrinsic motivation. According to a particular participant who downplayed high financial inducement as a motivating factor, he stressed his love for the military life by saying “I like their structure, their physique, uniform and their training.” He also points to their discipline and the respect he has for them as critical to his extreme willingness for military enlistment. This high level of willingness to enlist in the military also appears to be informed by *martial tendency*. In a display of extreme willingness, the participant dismissed the fear of death by stressing that “some people may talk about death if you go to war... but life is all about risks. Even at home, anything can happen. If you love the job, you don’t care the consequence.” In a similar manner, another participant submits that:

I just love risky jobs... because they say life self is risky. I also love risky jobs. I can’t just put my mind like going into office sitting for hours. That is why I choose, let me go for Fire Service because it is risky also.” [sic].

Individuals who fall under this category appear to be influenced by a high degree of *martial tendency*. This is consistent with the theory of intrinsic motivation and institutional motivations that were advanced by Griffith and Mosko respectively (Griffith, 2008; Moskos, 1977). According to the two, individuals who exhibit attribute that fall under this category are more likely to enlist and stay in the military.

Martial Tendency, Extreme Willingness and Conditional Willingness

Martial tendency is “the existence of the desire in an individual to experience the thrill and drills that are identified with life in the military including wars and conflicts.” (Murtala, 2020, p. 53). It is prevalent in individuals to different degrees. It can be considered as the key factor that influences whether an individual voluntarily enlists in the military or otherwise. Individuals that exhibit extreme unwillingness in voluntary enlistment can be considered as displaying very low or non-existent martial tendency. At the intermediate level, individuals that are conditionally willing to enlist in the military also appear to exhibit a level of martial tendency; however, their motivations are hinged on other extrinsic factors which fit into the occupational motivation theory of Moskos discussed earlier. At the extreme level, participants that display very high willingness to enlist in the military can be considered as exhibiting a very high level of martial tendency. By extension, this may partly explain why some foreigners travel to engage in wars abroad as it was observed in the recruitment of fighters by non-state actors like ISIS, or state actors like Ukraine among other factors (Dawson, 2021; Thorley, 2022)

Table 3: Distributional (un)willingness versus martial tendency

Distributional (un)willingness	Degree of martial tendency
Extreme Unwillingness	Absence of martial tendency
Conditional willingness (or unwillingness) towards voluntary service	Presence of martial tendency
Extreme willingness in voluntary military service	Presence of a high level of martial tendency

As observed in a previous study, the central determinant of willingness to voluntarily enlist in the military appears to be martial tendency. Some of the participants see the likelihood of death in military service or in the course of a war as a “natural thing since life, according to them, is

risky while others cringe at the thought of rifles” (Murtala, 2020, p. 53). As a result, it would not be far-fetched to suggest at this level that what is responsible for these different behaviours and predisposition could be martial tendency and the level of its existence in an individual.

Recommendations

In terms of policy implications, states that struggle with recruitment and retention can re-activate compulsory enlistment even though it may not be comfortable with the section of the population identified as having extreme unwillingness in the military. The alternative option is to compete in their enlistment of non-citizens especially those who appear to have occupational interest or martial tendency as explained above. For countries like USA, France, England, and others that already practise non-citizen enlistment, they can strengthen their hold in this area by making international adverts through their embassies or diplomatic units. With this, they may be able to address their manpower shortage through transnational recruitment. As noted above, manpower is important for military recruitment, and like several other assets, manpower is not infinite for a country that is continuously engaged in military confrontations. As a result, competition for recruitment in this regard may become more expensive. Finally, the identification of martial tendency as the most prominent predictor of willingness to enlist in the military strengthens the discourse on intrinsic motivation for military enlistment as identified in previous studies.

Distributional (un)willingness posits that the population of a state as it relates to military enlistment under AVF can be classified into three:

- i. extreme unwillingness in military service
- ii. conditional (un)willingness
- iii. extreme willingness.

With the transition to AVF, the freedom not to serve in the military has become the default social setting, thereby giving the unwilling section of the population freedom to hesitate as against the norm of being

almost automatically eligible to be drafted or perform substitute services. Nevertheless, by assessing the distribution of a population, we can understand their ‘usefulness’ towards active engagement in the military. In countries that use AVF but suffer from low turnout for voluntary military service, such as Belgium, USA, Germany and United Kingdom (NATO, 2007; Perraudin, 2019; Tobias, 2019; Winkie, 2022), there is a clear need to systematically understand the distribution of the population as the first step to address the shortage of manpower for the military and to understand that a country’s population (traditionally considered as an element of power) may not necessarily have a higher level of military recruitment turnover under AVF.

Conclusion

From the global perspective, even though the instrument of AVF has led to a drop in enlistment, there are still individuals that are attracted by the opportunity that a foreign military offers. In part, they may be motivated by transnational citizenship and, or occupational values. Here, different countries, such as Germany, Belgium, Australia, and others where AVF is practiced must compete with one another to provide occupational opportunities with competitive incentives to foreigners and citizens who are interested in the military. Strong occupational motivation with comparatively favourable incentives can induce nationals of other states to join a foreign military in different capacities whether as combatants or non-combatants. The motivation for non-combatant roles can be seen in the recent successful employment by China of retired British pilots and others to train its air force personnel against NATO or other western assets (Landler, 2022) while the existence of *Légion étrangère* exemplifies combatant roles. The possibility of poaching talents from around the world provides an advantage to countries that have the capability to do so. Of particular interest and rarity are individuals who are known to exhibit higher levels of *martial tendencies*.

R E F E R E N C E S

- Asal, V., Conrad, J., & Toronto, N. (2017). I Want You! The Determinants of Military Conscription. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(7), 1456–1481. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26363936>
- Asch, B. J., Kilburn, M. R., & Klerman, J. A. (1999). *Attracting College-Bound Youth into the Military. Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options*. RAND Distribution Services, 1700 Main Street, P.
- Choulis, I., Bakaki, Z., & Böhmelt, T. (2021). Public Support for the Armed Forces: The Role of Conscription. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 32(2), 240–251. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1709031>
- Clempson, R. (2011, July 31). Are Security Issues Most Effectively Addressed by a Neo-Realist IR Approach? *E-International Relations*. <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/31/are-security-issues-most-effectively-addressed-by-a-neo-realist-ir-approach/>
- CRIN. (2019). *Conscription by poverty? Deprivation and army recruitment in the UK*. Child Rights International Network. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5afadb22e17ba3eddf90c02f/t/5d5bbf83278b3100018306a4/1566293898095/UK_recruitment_report_final.pdf
- Dawson, L. L. (2021). *A Comparative Analysis of the Data on Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Who Went and Why?* 56. <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/02/dawson-comparative-analysis-final-1.pdf>
- Ella, K. (2021, September 16). US Military Recruitment and the Weaponization of Poverty | Redbrick Comment. *Redbrick*. <https://www.redbrick.me/us-military-recruitment-and-the-weaponization-of-poverty/>
- Galindo, G. (2019, July 18). *Snubbed by youth, Belgium's military has a staffing problem*. <https://www.brusselstimes.com/60962/belgian-army-retiring-officials-young-recruits-not-staying-staffing-problem-almost-half-military-departures>

- Ginexi, E. M., Miller, A. E., & Tarver, S. M. (1994). *A Qualitative Evaluation of Reasons for Enlisting in the Military: Interviews with new Active-Duty Recruits* (No. ADA293470; p. 49). Defense Manpower Data Center. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA293470.pdf>
- Griffith, J. (2008). Institutional Motives for Serving in the U.S. Army National Guard: Implications for Recruitment, Retention, and Readiness. *Armed Forces & Society*, 34(2), 230–258. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X06293864>
- Hagopian, A., & Barker, K. (2011). Should We End Military Recruiting in High Schools as a Matter of Child Protection and Public Health? *American Journal of Public Health*, 101(1), 19–23. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2009.183418>
- Jablonsky, D. (2006). *National Power* (U.S. Army War College Guide To National Security Policy And Strategy, pp. 127–142). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12025.14>
- Josep, B. (2022). *EU Ambassadors Annual Conference 2022: Opening speech by High Representative Josep Borrell | EEAS Website*. EEAS Brussels. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-ambassadors-annual-conference-2022-opening-speech-high-representative-josep-borrell_en.
- Kemp, K. W. (1993). Conscientious Objection. *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 7(4), 303–324. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40435857>
- Kingsley, D. (1954). The demographic foundations of national power. In B. Morroe, A. Theodore, & P. Charles H. (Eds.), *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (Vol. 49, pp. 863–866). Van Nostrand. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/freedom-and-control-in-modern-society-edited-by-morroee-berger-theodore-abel-and-charles-h-page-new-york-d-van-nostrand-company-inc1954-pp-xii-326-450/3E492C894A2645102B08E667DECC4F58>
- Kleykamp, M. A. (2006). College, Jobs, or the Military? Enlistment During a Time of War*. *Social Science Quarterly*, 87(2), 272–290. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2006.00380.x>

- Landler, M. (2022, October 17). China Recruiting Former R.A.F. Pilots to Train Its Army Pilots, U.K. Says. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/17/world/europe/china-recruit-uk-military-pilots.html>
- Leander, A. (2004). Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription. *Armed Forces & Society*, 30(4), 571–599. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0403000404>
- Levi, M. (1996). The Institution of Conscription. *Social Science History*, 20(1), 133–167. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1171506>
- Ll.m, T. M., & Thorley, A. (2022). *Foreign Fighters, Foreign Volunteers and Mercenaries in the Ukrainian Armed Conflict*. <https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-fighters-volunteers-mercenaries-in-ukraine/>
- Lobell, S. E. (2017). *Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism* (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.304>
- McGlynn, A., & Lavariega Monforti, J. (2010). *The Poverty Draft? Exploring the Role of Socioeconomic Status in U.S. Military Recruitment of Hispanic Students* (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 1643790). <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1643790>
- Moskos, C. C. (1977). From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization. *Armed Forces & Society*, 4(1), 41–50. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7700400103>
- Moskos, C. C. (1981). Making the All-Volunteer Force Work: A National Service Approach. *Foreign Affairs*, 60(1), 17–34. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20040987>
- Murtala, W. (2020). *An Examination of the Willingness to join the Belgian Military among Immigrants* [Dissertation, University of Antwerp]. <https://anet.uantwerpen.be/desktop/uantwerpen>
- NATO. (2007). *Recruiting & retention of mil personnel.pdf*. https://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/recruiting%20&%20retention%20of%20mil%20personnel.pdf.

- Perraudin, F. (2019, August 9). UK army combat units 40% below strength as recruitment plummets. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/09/uk-army-combat-units-40-below-strength-as-recruitment-plummets>
- Philipps, D. (2022, July 14). With Few Able and Fewer Willing, U.S. Military Can't Find Recruits. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/14/us/us-military-recruiting-enlistment.html>.
- Poutvaara, P., & Wagener, A. (2007). Conscription: Economic costs and political allure. *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, 2(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.15355/2.1.6>.
- Rostker, B. D. (2006). *The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9195.html
- Scheer, F. (2012). Power in general, and military power in particular. *Inflexions*, 20(2), 215–223. <https://doi.org/10.3917/infle.020.0215>.
- Schulz, R. (2019). Comparison of the salary of European armed forces. *SWP Working Paper, International Security Division*, 16.
- Tapia, M. A. B. (2020). The influence of military strength on national sovereignty in international relations. *Revista Científica General José María Córdova*, 18(30), Article 30. <https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.568>.
- Tobias, B. (2019, January 29). German army struggles to attract much-needed recruits. *Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/ffc33796-23ce-11e9-8ce6-5db4543da632>.
- Walt, S. M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2), 211–239. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>.
- Walt, S. M. (2010). Realism and Security. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.286>.

Winkie, D. (2022, July 19). Citing recruiting woes, Army will shed up to 28,000 troops in next year. *Army Times*. <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2022/07/19/army-will-be-up-to-28000-troops-understrength-vice-chief-tells-congress/>