

HISTORY & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Vol. 1, No. 1

March 2002

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ISSN 1597-1929

NIGERIAN JOURNAL OF

***THE POLITICS OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AS A THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY***

Charles Dokubo

1. INTRODUCTION

Nuclear arms have great killing capacity but are hard to get; chemical weapons are easy to get but lack such killing capacity; biological agents have both qualities)

During the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were the centerpieces of foreign policy. Nuclear arms hovered in the background of every major issue in East West competition and alliance relations. The highest priorities of Superpower and alliance policies could almost all be linked in some way to the danger of World War II and the fear of millions of casualties as a result of nuclear exchange.

Coming at the end of a decade that has seen increased attention paid to the threat of further proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and missiles delivery systems, the May 1998 nuclear test by India and Pakistan, the accusation of Iraq by the United States of developing weapons of mass destruction, has once again questioned the efficacy of the international attempts to prevent such proliferation. Yet, while states must take effective, coordinated action to strengthen and enforce mechanism for preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems, attention must not be diverted from the central priority of reinforcing the international regime to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The title of the article contains the phrase "global security." This concept is indicative of the change in our thinking about security. No longer is it possible for major countries to be able to insulate themselves from developments taking place around them in an interconnected and

interdependent world. Yet this is a recent realization. The end of the Cold War, the changing nature of security, and the technology driven dynamics of globalization are factors that have contributed to this realization. While countries will still have a "national perspective" arising out of their own geography and history, it is increasingly accepted that we are now dealing with global trends and global challenges. Our tasks today are to develop global responses to the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

This article will be divided into four sections. The first segment will deal with nuclear weapons, the second, with biological weapons, while the third will highlight chemical aspects of weapons. The fourth segment will deal with, nuclear strategies of the superpower, and finally, the fifth on the efforts to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: AN OVERVIEW

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are increasingly considered as part of a single problem of "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such short hand is convenient, by obscuring the real differences between these weapons. There exists a clear hierarchy among these weapons: nuclear weapons are the most difficult to construct, and their proven destructive and lethal capacity is tremendous; biological weapons are simpler to make than nuclear ones, and while they might be able to approach nuclear lethal capacity in specific circumstances, this is not easily accomplished; chemical weapons are the easiest to construct and have been used much more often, but fortunately their lethal capacity is not comparable. Weapons of Mass Destruction were first used in the last century, when Canadian troops were attacked with chemical weapons at Cypress in 1915. Chemicals were used extensively by both sides thereafter during World War I. Despite the prohibition of their use by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, chemicals were again used to a limited extent by the Japanese in their invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s, reportedly by Egypt against Yemen in the mid 1960s and allegedly Iraq in the 1980s, first in its war with Iran, and later, against its own Kurdish citizens. Biological weapons have not been used in warfare in modern times, though both the United States and the then Soviet Union developed large offensive biological warfare programs and arsenals during the Cold War. The U.S. program was ended after the negotiation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention (BTWC); however, the status of the former Soviet program is less clear.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

When nuclear weapons were born, they represented the most advanced military application of science, technology and engineering. Whereas conventional explosions result from the rearrangement amongst different atoms in the explosive materials, nuclear explosions, by contrast, result from rearrangement within the atomic nuclei themselves. Among the large number of exothermic nuclear reactions, there are three classes that deserve consideration. There are radioactivity, the property of spontaneous or induced change of certain isotopes, fission, the disintegration of nucleus into smaller nuclei brought about by bombardment; and fusion, the combination of two nuclei of small mass number to produce one nucleus of a higher mass number.

The principles on which nuclear explosions are created have been publicly well understood since the publication of the Smyth's Report. The numerical data on the nuclear properties of uranium, plutonium and tritium isotopes are also available in the open literature. There is no reason why a small group of people with basic knowledge of physics should not be able to discover the principle on which nuclear weapons might be constructed in a matter of weeks.

The difficulties are not conceptual but mainly practical. First, laboratory work is needed to verify that the fissionable materials which have been produced are of the percentage of purity required. Secondly, whether the device is based on uranium or plutonium and if the quantity is enough, experimental work with conventional explosives is probably unavoidable. This aspect of the task of devising a weapon is especially important for plutonium explosions, where efficiency requires that a sufficient quantity of plutonium is rapidly compressed by means of a carefully controlled explosion in a surrounding mass of conventional explosive.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Biological weapons differ fundamentally from other weapons of mass destruction. 'Whereas nuclear and chemical weapons cause immediate causalities, biological agents require hours to days or even weeks of incubation before they cause fatalities. Biological weapons are those that deliberately employ pathogenic materials to inflict disease or death in man, animal or plants. They consist of biological agents, and the munitions, equipment, or means employed for their delivery. Most biological weapon agents are living organisms that can reproduce and multiply following dispersion. This feature allows them to actually increase their effect over time. Additionally, some agents can cause contagion, meaning they can spread disease from one contaminated organism to another. Agents causing contagious disease have the potential to trigger an epidemic especially if local sanitation conditions are poor. From a biological warfare point of view, these agents are evidently more valuable, because they have the potential to inflict the greatest amount of damage. Other inherent features which influence the suitability of biological agents for warfare purposes include infectivity, virulence, toxicity, incubation period, lethality and stability.

Biological agents suitable for use in weapons are typically classified into five categories: bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi, and toxin. Bacteria are unicellular microorganisms, consisting of nuclear material, cytoplasm and cell membrane. They are generally rapidly grown in artificial solid or liquid culture media and replicate by straight division. Some bacteria are pathogenic and although most of these can be countered with antibiotics, strains can be selected that are resistant to known treatment. Bacterial agents usable in biological weapons include *Bacillus anthracis*, *Brucella suis*, *Yersinia pestis*, *Vibrio cholerae*, *Pasteurella tularensis*, and *Salmonella typhi*.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical weapons are those that deliberately employ the toxic properties of chemical substances to cause death or harm.

Chemical weapons consist of toxic chemicals and their precursors, and the munitions and devices used to deliver them to their target. Toxic chemicals are any chemicals, which through their chemical reactions cause death, injury, or temporary incapacitation to human or animals. Precursors

are any chemicals, which are part of the production of toxic chemicals. Although numerous chemical substances fit the description of toxic chemicals, in practice, only relatively few have been selected for chemical warfare. A toxic chemical suitable for use in chemical weapons must meet several requirements. First, the chemical must be sufficiently toxic so that it is effective when applied in minute quantities and yet not be too difficult to handle during and after the production process. Second, it must be stable enough to retain its toxicity during storage and to resist the stress associated with dissemination. Finally, it must be relatively easy to produce in sufficient quantities from readily available resources.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND COLD WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Long before the emergence of nuclear weapons, military doctrines of various kinds have been used to describe the intended conduct of future wars, to control or guide the use of force and to determine the conditions thereof. The existence of nuclear weapons and the rapid technological development in this field during the last 40 years have given rise to numerous military doctrines relating to the use of threat of nuclear weapons and led to their constant revision.

The concept of military doctrine is used in many different ways by the major military powers. In the West, military doctrines tend to be regarded as operational concepts whose postulates are confined to the use or threat of use of force. Thus, most strategic doctrines in the West deal with policies concerning the use of nuclear weapons. In the Soviet Union military, doctrine has a broader meaning and has been defined as "an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its armed forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting it and on preparation of the country and army for war." The Soviet view of military science embraces the entire range of political, economic and technological considerations, which might affect the course of a war.

Military doctrines are often formally expressed in statements and speeches by national leaders and ranking military personalities, but they are also reflected in the military preparations of a given state or groups of states, e.g. in decisions on procurement and deployment, in training, manuals, as well as in military and political periodicals and books.

A large spectrum of thinking exists on the subject of nuclear weapons and their possible use. This thinking is sometimes grouped into certain "schools", depending on the attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons and the role of these weapons in international relations. These schools range from total acceptance, through skepticism and relativism, to total rejection of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the theories that consider use of nuclear weapons as an integral element of the security of states are hard to reconcile with the ideas behind the United Nations Charter, sometimes referred to as the concept of "peace through law."

When evaluating the means and importance of military doctrines, consideration must be given to the fact that a given doctrine or doctrinal statement may serve different political and military purposes. Even if a particular doctrine has the form of operational concepts for the conduct of war, its objective may also be to serve as a political declaration with relevance for a situation of peace. Its main target can be a potential military adversary, its ally or a group of States allied to it, or even political and military circles in one's own State. Examples of this are the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, by which the Superpowers try to convince each other that it is meaningless to use nuclear weapons against each other.

The credibility of a certain doctrine is naturally dependent upon the means to implement it. Although, any doctrine can be openly professed. To be credible, a State must have at least, at its disposal, the military means, which would correspond to the doctrine. A State must also display that it has the will, if need be, to implement it.

CONTROLLING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The aim of this section is to examine the extent to which institutions and politics regulate the spread of nuclear weapons such as the NPT are hegemonic in character and to consider how the proliferation of such weapons is thereby affected.

A hegemonic regime or system may be defined as one where the leading actor has the capacity and will to determine, maintain or change the fundamental rules and procedures regulating relations between participants. While the hegemonic power will closely identify its own interests with the persistence of the system, it may not invariably benefit disproportionately

from that arrangement and on occasion, other members may derive equal or more gain from it.

In contemporary international relations, the notion of hegemony is employed to denote a variety of relationships and in its very broad sense refers to situations where parties' contribution to, and gain from, their interaction is substantially asymmetrical. In this section, it is assumed that full hegemony (as distinct from hegemonic tendencies) obtains when interstate relations and institutions are characterized by the preponderance of one or two parties (i.e. dual hegemony), who impose rules, which do not necessarily apply to themselves.

Turning to weapons of mass destruction capabilities, it is clear that by numerical and qualitative indices, the United States and the then Soviet Union are far superior to the other countries possessing such arms. This predominance is recognized in a number of ways, not least in their exclusive bilateral negotiations at SALT for more than a decade. None of the other nuclear weapon countries has the means to play a global military role. The United Kingdom's nuclear force relies on the United States for its missile launching system, supplies of enriched uranium and satellite reconnaissance intelligence and is integrated in the NATO alliance arrangements. To a large extent, France and China were impelled to acquire nuclear weapons in order to assert their independence from, respectively, the United States and the Soviet Union, and neither country's nuclear force has a lethality or sophistication comparable to that of the two superpowers. All five of the nuclear weapon states, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, have a special status and responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. As leaders of their respective alliances and international society, combined with their preponderant nuclear weapons capacity, the United States and the former Soviet Union shared a peculiar obligation to defend international peace but especially to avoid and prevent a nuclear war.

Arguments in Support of Hegemonic View:

The Treaty on Nonproliferation

Evidence in support of the charge of hegemony can be found in the nature of the negotiations preceding and in the discriminatory articles of the Treaty.

(a) Negotiating the treaty

Writing about the final series of negotiations on the treaty, one official noticed the very unusual occurrence in the post war era of " .. a close tacit understanding between the United States and Soviet Union." Once the two superpowers resolved the principal bilateral issue in the bargaining, which concerned the proposed establishment to achieving a lateral nuclear force in NATO, the major impediment to achieving a Treaty was eliminated. A number of participants like India, Brazil, West Germany and Japan had grave objections to or worries about aspects like the safeguard system and commercial issues of the Soviet and United States drafts. The superpowers responded to these anxieties by, on the one hand, seeking to persuade allies of the need to and benefits deriving from support of their proposals and, on the other, insisting that no substantial changes could be made, thus forcing States to choose between a very imperfect agreement or no treaty. The great majority of states chose the former option.

(b) Provisions and Implementation of the Treaty

The charge of hegemony regarding the content and operation of the Treaty appeals to three inter related aspects. These are the asymmetrical nature of the obligations imposed, the varying extent of compliance with it and the differing and discriminatory arrangements for monitoring observance as between nuclear and non nuclear weapon states. For a number of the latter countries, the cost of closing the option to go nuclear, as required by Article Two, led them not to adhere to the Treaty while some signatories displayed their concern that the pact would inhibit the development of their civil nuclear industry by delaying ratification. There is no reason to believe that the non nuclear weapon parties, including those with a capacity to develop such arms, have not fulfilled Treaty obligations which registers their inferior military status and complied with a safeguard system form which the nuclear armed states are exempt.

Article One of the Treaty obliged the three nuclear weapon parties not to do two things, one of which they were especially anxious not to do, the other being an option which one or two might have used. The first and probably more important choice concerns assisting other States to acquire independent nuclear arms, the second refers to the granting of access to

or a share in the control of nuclear arms. The more onerous Treaty commitments of the nuclear weapon parties involved efforts to halt vertical proliferation, moves towards nuclear disarmament and facilitating the transfer under appropriate safeguards of the benefits of non military technology, including peaceful nuclear explosions, to non nuclear weapon states. Evidently, the superpowers have not attained nuclear disarmament but whether they have met their obligation under Article Six to negotiate in good faith on effective measures to halt their nuclear arms competition is very doubtful. In the decade since the Treaty came into force and particularly during the first five years, the superpowers negotiated a series of arms control agreements, embracing the limitation of defensive nuclear systems, the regulation of, but not the cessation of the enhancement of offensive nuclear arms, arrangements on accidental and unintended outbreak of nuclear war and for effective communication and consultation in crises. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union and United States also developed a degree of mutual trust, this being an essential pre condition for the control and reduction of arms, but by the end of the decade this confidence seemed to have eroded.

TIGHTENING CONTROLS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES

While the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of both biological and chemical weapons, it did not prohibit their possession or have any enforcement provision. Attention focused on chemical weapons in the 1980s following their use in the Iran Iraq war. In 1985, the informal Australia Group was established to prevent the proliferation of such weapons while negotiations were undertaken to complete a more comprehensive chemical Weapons Convention. Over the next several years, the mandate of the Australia Group expanded, first to include biological weapons, and, after the revelations of the extent of Iraq's CBW programs and the Tokyo subway attack, to consideration of sub State groups as well as states themselves. The 30 member group now applies collective decisions through national export control systems to limit the transfer of items that appear on a warning list, including: chemical precursors, equipment used in the production of chemical and biological weapons and biological warfare agents and organism.

After years of negotiation, the Chemical Weapons Conventions (CWC), which prohibits the development, manufacture and possession of such weapons, entered into force in 1997. In addition to capping CW proliferation by law in over 1000 countries, and being the first global, verifiable arms control and disarmament agreement to ban an entire class of weaponry, the Convention has begun to roll back programs in a number of states, such as China, India and South Korea, that unexpectedly declared having chemical weapons production facilities or stockpiles. Above all, the Chemical Weapons Convention has established a new standard for intrusive international verification procedures, which are administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The first year of activity under the Convention saw progress in advancing its goals, but several suspected chemical weapon States have still not signed it. Also, since they have not yet submitted the data required by its transparency regime, a majority of CWC States Parties was in "technical non compliance" with the Convention at the one year mark.

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibited the manufacture and stockpiling of such weapons, although it permitted research in order to develop defenses. A serious flaw in this Convention was its lack of the verification provisions included in more recently negotiated treaties. Efforts have been underway since 1994 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to strengthen the transparency and verification procedures of the Convention, using the Chemical Weapons Convention as a model. These efforts have to date produced the "rolling text" of a proposed verification Protocol, but much disputed language remains to be negotiated, leaving the timing and content of any result far from certain.

In 1987, following the "War of the Cities" between Iraq and Iran, Canada and other G7 States established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to restrict transfer of nuclear capable missiles. In 1993, the scope of the MTCR was expanded to cover unmanned delivery systems capable of carrying chemical or biological weapons. In addition to the growth of formal membership in the regime, which now stands at 28 states, others, such as Israel and Ukraine have announced that they will adhere to the MTCR guidelines.

6. NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTIONS

In response to the increased dangers, governments have been spending vastly more on armaments. After a decade of decline, global military expenditures are heading back towards \$1000 billion per year peaks of the Cold War. The expenditures, of course, do not translate into extra security; but they do reduce what is available to meet economic and social needs in a world where over a billion people live on less than \$1 a day. And the greater reliance on force rather than on rule of international law has sapped energy from all multilateral forums.

As a result, the institutional "machinery" set in place by S SOD I is now moribund. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has not been able to do any substantive work since 1996. The Disarmament Commission, after being unable to meet in its 50th anniversary years (2001), concluded a three year cycle of work in 2002 without being able to agree on anything. The General Assembly itself has been reduced to adopting ritualistic resolutions on serious questions, with no real prospect that they will be implemented. The one bright spot in all this is that UN mechanisms keep governments focused on major issues.

Major treaty bodies have also fared badly. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is under heavy stress. North Korea has pulled out of it, and there is talk that Iran will follow. Threats of force against so called "outlaw" States, and vigilante action to interdict suspect cargo in aircraft, ships, trains and trucks are unsatisfactory and dangerous alternatives to an effective treaty. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, flawed at birth by excluding laboratory and sub critical nuclear tests that allow further development of nuclear weapons, has been further nullified by rejection in the United States Senate and then by the Bush administration. The Biological Weapons Convention did not get a verification protocol despite a six year cycle of negotiations, and the laborious effort to shape one has now begun again. The Chemical Weapons Convention's lack of universality points to an extremely dangerous situation in the Middle East, where there has been a steady escalation of force in recent years. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large

arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every State House, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet, we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written, America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence, as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic and military strength. That table, though scared by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together, we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose.

CONCLUSION

The acceleration of high tech weapons development by the United States, together with a policy and practice of unilateral warfare against those that the U.S. declares to be unacceptable threats, likely has destroyed the last meaningful vestiges of Cold War arms control. To free itself from restraints on its own weapons development, the United States has withdrawn from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and repudiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These two actions alone break important

U.S. commitments made only three years ago, at the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, to take concrete steps that would manifest an "unequivocal undertaking" to accomplish the elimination of nuclear weapons. Together with a declared intention to seek nuclear superiority for the foreseeable future, and a wide range of actions to develop new capabilities in every element of nuclear weapons systems from strike planning and command and control to bombs, missile warheads, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these steps also represent a final, decisive repudiation of the central element of the (NPT) bargain: the promise by the nuclear weapons states to negotiate in good faith for the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The "disarmament" obligation entered into by the nuclear weapons states that are NPT parties encompasses not only nuclear explosives, but also "the means of their delivery." The United States is engaged in no negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons. And U.S. policy calls not for nuclear parity, but superiority.

The fielding of a credible and effective land based strategic nuclear deterrent force beyond 2020 supports the DoD corporate level goals of shaping the international security environment and responding throughout the full spectrum of conflict by deterring hostile actors/activities in peacetime and in times of crisis. This force also will prepare the U.S. for an uncertain future by maintaining U.S. qualitative superiority in nuclear war fighting capabilities in the 2020-2040 time frame.

The wide ranging effort by the United States to develop missiles with a new set of capabilities far greater accuracy, improved maneuvering, and the ability to slow down in the atmosphere and deploy a wide range of armaments—ranging from self-guiding conventional munitions to sensors—also is likely to make control of long range missiles through diplomacy and international agreements impossible in the foreseeable future. Effective, universal missile controls, beginning with the easily verifiable mechanism of a ban on flight testing of long range missiles for military purposes, are technically feasible. A flight test ban would be a far cheaper, and likely more effective, solution to the "rogue state missile threat" as it has been represented to the American people by their government than ballistic missile defense. Yet the United States has shown no interest in any kind of universal controls that might rein in both the spread of dangerous missile technologies on the one hand, and on the

other, the development of more capable, threatening missiles by those who, like the United States already have large, advanced missile arsenals. The kinds of missile controls the U.S. has been willing to back all assume and enforced a world of technological haves and have nots, in which the United States may continue to expand its advantage in missile technology at will, while threatening war to force others to adhere to rules it would never accept.

One reason for this is that the main concern of U. S. policy makers is not a bolt from the blue attack against U.S. debate over missile defense, with its almost exclusive focus on mid course interception of international ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. The principal near term worry of U.S. military planners is that the spread of missiles, together with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons will make it difficult to project overwhelming military force in regions where it demands access to resources and markets on favorable terms. This is the meaning of turgid Defense Department formulations like that in its Quadriennial Defense Review.

A reorientation of the posture must take account of new challenges, particularly anti access and area denial threats. New combinations of immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets; information operations capabilities; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations have the potential to be a significant force multiplier for forward stationed forces, including forcible entry forces.^{2°}

Translated into plain English, this means the following: The United States claims the need and the right to deploy overwhelming military force right up to the shores of distant potential adversaries. Previously, the U.S. largely could do this with impunity, because the targets of its "small wars" lacked any means to hit the huge U.S. air bases, military seaports, and lines of supply necessary to support war making on the other side of the world. The acquisition of missiles and nuclear (and to a lesser extent chemical or biological) weapons by countries the United States may wish to intimidate, coerce or attack makes these bases and supply lines vulnerable. The current United States response to this is a full bore attempt to retain global military dominance through high tech weapons, including missile defenses

and new generations of strategic weapons operating through and from space, intended to both defend forward deployed forces and reduce the need for them. Nuclear weapons continue to play a central role in U.S. expeditionary warfare strategy, providing, in the words of a recent Air Force "transformation" planning document, "the deterrent umbrella under which joint conventional forces operates."

The U.S. government claims that more useable nuclear weapons and conventional strategic weapons with global range will make war, and nuclear weapons use, less likely. They contend that the endless enhancement of the spectrum of violence makes U.S. threats more "credible," and as a result adversaries will be "deterred." The way this is presented to the U.S. population rests on a central fiction: that all these weapons are intended only to defend the United States against unprovoked attack. But the Bush Administration, in its September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, announced a policy of preventive war, in which it claimed the right to attack any country it unilaterally determines to be a threat. And the Iraq war shows that it will attack other countries for reasons of its own choosing, without U.N. authorization, and without credible evidence of a present threat to the United States.

To understand the implications of the massive high tech weapons buildup now underway, we must consider how the United States looks to the rest of the world. With a government that grows more duplicitous by the day, we may never know the exact mix of motivations control of Iraq's oil, more grandiose geopolitical visions of "imposing stable access for Western corporations to its markets and resources that drove those in power to attack Iraq. But that war, combined with the continuing stream of veiled and overt threats issued by influential U.S. government officials against countries ranging from North Korea to Syria and Iran, suggest that the U.S. is an unpredictable and dangerous power with shifting internal political alignments, dominated by factions that will push for war for a variety of reasons.

Against this background, the pursuit of new and improved strategic weapons of all kinds, combined with the unprecedented advantage held by the United States in conventional arms and the logistical capacity to deploy large military forces across great distances, is rapidly eroding existing arms control measures, and erecting enormous obstacles to future

negotiations. The United States long has taken the position that its own behavior plays little part in decisions by others to seek nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them, claiming that despite U.S. efforts, for example, to modernize its nuclear weapons complex, "proliferation drivers for other states, such as international competition or the desire to deter conventional armed forces, would remain unchanged...." This position flies in the face of reality in a world where the United States deploys powerful and growing military forces in most regions, and where increasingly the "conventional armed forces" that potential proliferators "desire to deter" are those of the United States and its nuclear armed allies.

U.S. officials do in fact believe that their huge military buildup will influence the behavior of other states; they just hope to send a different message. In the words of the National Security Strategy of the United States, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. And should such "dissuasion" prove less than satisfactory in the unilateral and unreviewable judgment of U.S. political and military leaders, the United States "will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.

Contrary to the hopes of many generations, horrified by the experience of war, military power has retained its dominating place in international relations. The "militarization" of many parts of the world and, as it would seem, even space, is progressing. It does not openly invite, it certainly facilitates the recourse to arms. At the same time wars will become more destructive and more expensive. Where conflicts have receded—as in Europe—it is due more to the fear of mutual suicide than to voluntary restraint or the enlightened admission that the use of force is futile or counterproductive. But even here the tranquility is bought at the heavy price of maintaining immense arsenals of weaponry.

In the eyes of most states the use (or threat of use) of force still pays. As we have seen, attitudes of people and states to force and war differ. To some they are at best a necessary evil, to other the highest of glory and self fulfillment. Also the ability for self defence remains something no state is prepared to give up. But military force becomes a threat where it either goes beyond such legitimate security interests or where its uses seem to

promise political rewards.

The military should be unburdened" from responsibilities it either can not assume or only at increasing cost. This is true for East West relations as it is true for re establishing peace in the Middle East. The United States must realize that no accumulation of military power will guarantee her the degree of influence in world politics they may desire. The then Soviet Union learned of late that the immense growth of her military power is neither healing the social and political woes of Eastern Europe nor yielding the expected political dividends in the rest of the world. In a general sense we must apply the same conclusion to many places of conflict and tension in the world at large where the use of armed force becomes more liability than an asset.

One of the central questions regarding the future of nonproliferation will therefore be how to unburden the acquisition of nuclear weapons from its traditional function as guarantor of stability and security. If it can be done—which most people would welcome—how would it happen and how far could one go? Obviously there is no general recipe. But to raise the question at all is always a step in the right direction.

Various efforts have been made to avert or reduce the danger of a nuclear war by improving communication between the nuclear powers. They range from the so called "Hot Line" between Washington and Moscow (and London Moscow and Paris Moscow) to the project of a joint Soviet American crisis center which would be in operation every hour of every day. It would be a not improvement over the "Hot Line." It provided a permanent monitoring by and communication between, the two superpowers regarding action that might be misunderstood and head to wrong reactions.

Thus there are many ways and means to create an international environment conducive to a reduction regime. None of the above mentioned signposts leading to final nonproliferation treaty requires a fundamental change of our present international system. In a sense it would amount to a non proliferation regime without tears, i.e. nonproliferation without any sacrifice for national sovereignty. States would accept a voluntary restriction of their peaceful nuclear programs without having to subject themselves to the control and sanction, of an all powerful international authority.

We are now more than forty years from the first bomb. We now

have more than twenty thousand atomic warheads owned by the then superpowers. But in forty years to come, more than twenty countries will have more than fifty thousand atomic warheads. So until nuclear powers view the issue of proliferation as that of right and obligation we will have to learn to live in a world of many nuclear nations. The lesson of Munich in 1938 was that the strong would not protect the weak at their own expense. The danger now is that the weak will seek to become strong through weapons that can eventually defeat everyone. Will we have an alternative to nonproliferation and disarmament?

ENDNOTES

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